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The Italian Legislature and International and EU Obligations of Domestic 
Criminalisation
Dr Marco Longobardo




This article explores the nature and content of international and EU obligations to adopt 
certain criminal domestic legislation, and the impact that they have on the Italian legislature. 
In light of relevant international, EU, and domestic law provisions, the article investigates 
what is required of Italy to implement obligations of domestic criminalisation. It is argued 
that the Italian legislature is bound to implement obligations of domestic criminalisation 
both under international law and the Italian constitutional law. The article ends with an 
overview of the consequences under international law that Italy may face for failure to 
implement international and EU obligations of domestic criminalisation. 
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1 Introduction
This article offers an overview on the nature and content of international obligations 
to adopt certain criminal domestic legislation (hereinafter: ‘obligations of domestic 
criminalisation’),1 and the impact that they have on the Italian legislature. The article tackles 
these issue from the perspective of the generalist international lawyer, relying in particular 
on notions and rules that are applicable to any branch of international law. The article mainly 
answers questions as to what is required of a state in order to implement obligations of 
domestic criminalisation – considering in particular the Italian legislative bodies – and 
which are the consequences of a state’s failure to implement an obligation of domestic 
criminalisation. Since the focus of the article is on the Italian legal system, only international 
instruments binding Italy are examined here. The expression ‘Italian legislature’ refers 
mainly to the Italian Parliament, which is tasked with legislative functions by Article 70 of 
the Italian Constitution (ItConst), as well as to the Italian government when acting under 
Articles 76 and 77, and to the Italian Regions pursuant to Article 117.
Although criminal law usually falls in the remit of domestic law, in relation to crimes 
entailing certain serious violations of human rights and transnational crimes, states 
cooperate to ensure that certain actions are punished as crimes. To this end, a number of 
international conventions bind states to adopt criminal legislation in a specific field. Even 
customary international law sometimes, as in relation to war crimes, requires states to adopt 
1 On procedural criminal obligations – outside the purview of this article –, see Stefano Manacorda, ‘Dovere 
di punire? Gli obblighi di tutela penale nell’era della internazionalizzazione del diritto’, in Massimo Meccarelli 
et al. (eds.), Il lato oscuro dei diritti umani (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, 2014), pp. 307-347.
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domestic criminal legislation.2 Moreover, in the last decades, the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council (SC) has adopted binding resolutions that embody obligations of domestic 
criminalisation, raising concerns regarding its potential transformation into a global 
legislative body.3 
Similarly, under Article 83(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), the European Union (EU) may adopt ‘minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border 
dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to 
combat them on a common basis.’4 This provision enables the EU to adopt directives, which 
do not have direct effects but bind member states to incorporate criminal law provisions in 
their legal systems through national legislation.5 In this respect, obligations of domestic 
criminalisation are seen as a means to implement EU policies when all the other means – 
different from criminal legislation – are unavailable.6 
2 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case no. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 10 November 1998, para. 148.
3 E.g., Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, ‘On the Security Council’s “Law-Making”’, 83 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 
(2000) 609-725; Catherine Denis, Le pouvoir normative du Conseil de Security des Nations Unies: Portée et 
limites (Bruylant, Brussells, 2004); Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’, 99 American 
Journal of International Law (2005) 175-193.
4 The provision continues with a list of relevant crimes. Before the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, under old Article 32 
of the Treaty in the European Union (TEU), the EU could adopt ‘measures establishing minimum rules relating 
to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties’ in certain fields, through framework decisions or 
establishing conventions to be recommended to member states (old Article 34(2) TEU).
5 CJEU, Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02, Judgment, 3 May 2005; Italian Constitutional Court 
(ItCC), no. 28/2010, judgment, 25 January 2010.
6 Kai Ambos, European Criminal Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2018), p. 322.
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All these instruments are a parcel of a wider attempt to use international law ‘as a tool 
for the coordination of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by states’.7 These obligations of 
domestic criminalisation may relate to what are usually called international core crimes (war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression),8 or may regard different 
unlawful conduct (e.g., the illicit trade of endangered animal species).9 An international 
crime is a conduct that is considered to be criminal by international law itself – thus directly 
imposing an international law obligation upon individuals10 –, whereas a duty to adopt 
domestic criminal legislation binds only the state, without necessarily entailing direct 
responsibility for individuals. 
The ratio of the obligations of domestic criminalisation is that domestic legal orders 
are presumed to be sufficiently equipped to prevent and punish certain conduct.11 To make 
a very simplistic example, the UN has no powers to prosecute all the acts of terrorism that 
occur around the world; yet, the UN may induce states to accept a treaty obligating them to 
combat terrorist activities at the domestic level,12 or force them to do so through a binding 
7 Paola Gaeta, ‘International Criminalization of Prohibited Conduct’, in Antonio Cassese (ed.) The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP, Oxford, 2009), p. 64.
8 See Bartolini, Gianelli, and Prosperi in this Special Issue.
9 E.g., Article VIII of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.
10 Edoardo Greppi, Crimini internazionali dell’individuo (UTET, Torino, 2012), p. 469; Gerhald Werle and 
Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (4th ed., OUP, Oxford, 2020), p. 36.
11 In the field of international crimes, the same idea supports the principle of complementarity under Art. 17 
of the 1998 International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute.
12 E.g., the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
5
decision of the UNSC.13 Accordingly, obligations of domestic criminalisation are a tool to 
ensure that states prevent and punish certain actions. 
In so-called dualistic systems, where international law and domestic law are 
considered to be separate legal spheres,14 the fact that a state accepts the obligation to 
criminalise a certain conduct does not turn that conduct in a domestic crime unless this is 
the result of one of the constitutional implementation mechanisms of that state. The ItConst, 
for instance, adopt a dualistic approach15 and, accordingly, it is necessary to study how Italy 
has implemented, or should implement, international and EU obligations of domestic 
criminalisation.16 Moreover, obligations of domestic criminalisation usually are not directly 
applicable, but rather, they are not ‘sufficiently clear to function as “objective law” in the 
domestic legal order’,17 and, as result, a legislative intervention is needed. The actual 
adoption of new legislation may take time, due to the complexities of the domestic 
13 E.g., S/RES/1373 (2001). For more, see Capone in this Special Issue.
14 E.g., Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, ‘International Law and Interindividual Law’, 86 Rivista di Diritto 
Internazionale (2003) 909–999; Giorgio Gaja, ‘Dualism: A Review’, in Janne E. Nijman and André 
Nollkaemper (eds.), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National Law & International Law (OUP, 
Oxford, 2007), pp. 52–62.
15 See generally Giuseppe Cataldi, ‘Italy’, in Dinah Shelton (ed.), International Law and Domestic Legal 
Systems (OUP, Oxford, 2011), pp. 328-359.
16 See infra, section 3.1.
17 André Nollkaemper, ‘The Netherlands’, in David L Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty 
Enforcement: A Comparative Study (CUP, Cambridge 2009) 333. For more on the direct application of treaties 
by domestic courts and the related notion of ‘self-executing obligations’, see David L. Sloss, ‘Domestic 
Application of Treaties’, in Duncan B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (2nd ed., OUP, Oxford, 
2020), pp. 355-381.
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legislative procedures or the inactivity of legislative bodies – which are political organs. 
The possibility that a state accepts an international obligation of domestic legislation 
without implementing it at domestic level is far from absurd: e.g., for decades, Italy has not 
implemented the duty to criminalise torture.18
This article clarifies the nature and content of international obligations of domestic 
criminalisation, and the impact that they have on the Italian legislature and the Italian legal 
system. First, the article explores the nature of obligations of domestic criminalisation in 
light of the difference between obligations of conduct and obligations of result. The article 
goes on to demonstrate that the Italian legislature is bound to implement obligations of 
domestic criminalisation both under international law and the ItConst, offering an overview 
of the possible measures that the Italian legislation should adopt in light of the specific 
nature and content of the relevant obligations. Finally, the article assesses the consequences 
in the field of state responsibility for lack of implementation or for inadequate 
implementation.19
2 Different Kinds of Obligations of Domestic Criminalisation
2.1 Preliminary Remarks
In addressing obligations of domestic criminalisation, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that there is no such uniform category under international law. Rather, this group may be 
interpreted as including different kinds of obligations. The following subsections attempts 
18 See Gianelli in this Special Issue.
19 On domestic remedies, see Bonafé and Amoroso in this Special Issue.
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to systematise some of these obligations, with exclusive reference to instruments binding 
upon Italy. This exercise is needed since different sub-groups of obligations may entail 
different actions upon the Italian legislature. Eventually, a correct understanding of the kind 
of obligation at stake determines some issues of state responsibility.
2.2 Explicit International Obligations of Domestic Criminalisation 
There are several obligations embodied in international law treaties, UN resolutions, 
and EU instruments that explicitly demand States to adopt domestic criminal law. For this 
reason, they are labelled here as explicit international obligations of domestic 
criminalisation. Indeed, the command to enact domestic criminal legislation is explicit only 
in this group.
Article VIII of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora, e.g., reads that: ‘The Parties shall . . . penalize trade in, or possession of, 
[protected] specimens, or both’. Similarly, paragraph 1(b) on the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001) states that States must ‘criminalize the wilful provision or 
collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their 
territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are 
to be used, in order to carryout terrorist acts.’ Likewise, Article 3(1) of EU Directive 
2017/1371 reads: ‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that fraud 
affecting the Union’s financial interests constitutes a criminal offence when committed 
intentionally’. In these cases, it is clear which is the content of the obligations: states parties 
must criminalize the relevant conduct as a consequence of an explicit (and, sometimes, quite 
detailed) obligation of domestic criminalisation. 
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This kind of explicit obligations is common in relation to international crimes and 
transnational crimes, whereas only few UN human rights law treaties and none of the most 
relevant regional ones embody them.20 Very appropriately, Schwarzenberger considered 
these obligations as resulting in ‘internationally prescribed municipal criminal law’.21 
Correctly, he noted that if States ‘should fail to live up to their treaty obligations, they . . . 
are merely responsible for breach of their treaty obligations.’22 This means that a violation 
of the duty to criminalise certain conduct should not be equated to the commission of the 
prohibited conduct, but rather, it is only a source of state responsibility for the violation of 
that specific treaty commitment.23
As implicitly affirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the international 
obligations of domestic criminalisation stricto sensu are obligations of result24 rather than 
20 E.g., Article 4 of the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture (CAT). For more examples, see Anja Seibert-
Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford, OUP 2009), pp. 158-188; Steven Malby, 
Criminal Theory and International Human Rights Law (Routledge, Abingdon, 2020), pp. 65-84.
21 Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law’, 3 Current Legal Problems (1950) 
263, 266.
22 Ibid., p. 267.
23 Ibid., p. 268.
24 See Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 20 July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, 422, para. 
75. See also Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International 
Responsibility of States’, 35 German Yearbook of International Law (1992) 9, 48; Nienke van der Have, The 
Prevention of Gross Human Rights Violations Under International Human Rights Law (Springer, The Hague, 
2018), p. 11; Maria Monnheimer, Due Diligence Obligations in International Human Rights Law (Cambridge, 
CUP, 2021), pp. 67–68.
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obligations of conduct.25 This means that these obligations are obligations to succeed in 
introducing that specific offence in the national criminal law system. Although states are 
free to decide the way in which criminal law should be introduced – e.g., a state may decide 
to adopt specific legislation whereas another can decide to amend existing acts26 – 
nonetheless the fulfilment of that obligation is measured based on whether the state has 
adopted the relevant criminal provisions, with no room for assessing alternatives or the 
relevance of the diligence adopted by the state. 
2.3 Implicit Obligations of Domestic Criminalisation
Sometimes, treaties are interpreted as if they included obligations of domestic 
criminalisation, even though there is no explicit duty in the text of the relevant instruments. 
This phenomenon is particularly common in relation to human rights treaties, which usually 
establish international courts or non-adjudicative mechanisms to monitor the 
implementation of human rights. Since these bodies have de jure an institutional role on the 
interpretation of the relevant conventions, and de facto are regarded as authoritative 
25 On this difference, see Constantin P. Economidés, ‘Content of the Obligation: Obligations of Means and 
Obligations of Result’, in James Crawford et al. (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP, Oxford, 
2010), p. 371.
26 More on this, infra, section 3.2. 
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interpreters,27 their interpretive action results in the creation of implicit28 obligations of 
domestic criminalisation. 
Two main situations can be distinguished. On the one hand, sometimes states accept 
duties to protect human rights through generic ‘legislative’ measures, i.e. measures not 
involving criminal law. E.g., under Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), states must ‘adopt such laws or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.’ Some specific 
provisions of the Covenant restate this obligation, such as Article 6(1), that affirms that the 
right to life ‘shall be protected by law’. With regard to other rights, the Covenant does not 
repeat this caveat, such as in relation to the ban on torture under Article 7, which should be 
read, however, in light of Article 2(2). The Human Rights Committee (HRC) interprets both 
articles as including obligations of domestic criminalisation. According to the HRC, Article 
6(1) means that ‘states parties must enact a protective legal framework which includes 
effective criminal prohibitions on all manifestations of violence or incitement to violence 
27 On the weight of the interpretation offered by non-judicial human rights bodies, see Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment, 30 November 2010, I-C.J. Reports 
2010 (II), 664, para. 66.
28 See Francesco Viganò, ‘L’arbitrio del non punire: sugli obblighi di tutela penale dei diritti fondamentali’, 
in Marta Bertolino et al. (eds.), Studi in onore di Mario Romano (Jovene, Napoli, 2011), pp. 2651-2662, 2664-
2672; van der Have, supra note 24, p. 42; Domenico Carolei, ‘Cestaro v. Italy: The European Court of Human 
Rights on the Duty to Criminalise Torture and Italy’s Structural Problem’, 17 International Criminal Law 
Review (2017) 567-585, 572.
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that are likely to result in a deprivation of life’.29 Likewise, the Committee held that ‘states  
parties  should  indicate  when  presenting  their  reports  the  provisions  of  their criminal 
law which penalize torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment’.30 
The fact that the reference to ‘law’ is read as referring to ‘criminal law’ is not discussed in 
greater detail. 
Similarly, this is the case of the protection of the right to life under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which has been interpreted by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) as embodying some obligations of domestic criminalisation.31 
Article 2 states that: ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.’ Although there is 
nothing in this provision about criminal law, the Court has maintained in several judgments 
that Article 2, read in conjunction with the duty to secure rights under Article 1, should be 
interpreted as including an obligation to put ‘in place effective criminal-law provisions to 
29 HRC, General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, on the right to life (CCPR/C/GC/36) para. 20 (emphasis added).
30 HRC, General comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment) (A/44/40), para 13.
31 See Francesco Bestagno, Diritti umani e impunità: obblighi positivi degli stati in materia penale 
(Vita&Pensiero, Milan, 2003); Alastair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart, Oxford, 2004); 
Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘Responsabilité de l’État pour violation des obligations positives relatives aux 
droits de l’homme’, (2008) 333 Recueil des cours 175-506; Madelaine Colombine, La technique des 
obligations positives en droit de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (Dalloz, Paris, 2014). 
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deter the commission of offences against the person’.32 The Court has developed a similar 
case law in relation to the ban on slavery and forced labour under Article 4.33
However, other times, human rights obligations are interpreted as including 
obligations of domestic criminalisation even though there is no reference to protection by 
the law in the relevant instrument. This is the case of the ban on torture under Article 3 of 
the ECHR, according to which: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’ Yet, the ECtHR interpreted this provision by affirming 
that it ‘requires states to put in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the 
commission of offences against personal integrity’.34 Interestingly, and contrary to its case 
law on the right to life, in most of the cases, the Court refrained from holding that Article 3 
embodies a positive obligation of domestic criminalisation, thanks to the reference under 
Article 1 to the duty to ‘secure’ the conventional rights. Rather, the Court affirmed that 
Article 3 embodies a positive obligation to prosecute and punish acts of torture, which 
requires, as a prerequisite, the fact that torture is criminalised at domestic level.35 It appears 
32 Osman v. UK, no. 87/1997/871/1083, judgment, 28 October 1998, para. 115. See, also, Nikolova and 
Velichkova v. Bulgaria, no. 7888/03, 20 December 2007, para. 57; Tomašić et al v. Croatia, no. 46598/06, 
judgment, 15 January 2009, para. 49; Tunç and Tunç v. Turkey, no. 24014/05, judgment, 25 June 2013, para. 
171. 
33 Siliadin v. France, no. 73316/01, judgment, 26 October 2005, para. 89.
34 Beganović v. Croatia, no. 46423/06, judgment, 25 June 2009, para. 71. See, also, O’Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], 
no. 35810/09, judgment, 28 February 2014, para. 148; Cestaro v. Italy, no. 6884/11, judgment, 7 April 2015, 
para. 209.
35 Gäfgen v. Germany, no. 22978/05, judgment, 1 June 2010, para. 117; Cestaro v. Italy, supra note 34, para. 
209.
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that the Court is adopting a more cautious approach: states that do not criminalise torture 
breach the positive obligation to investigate/prosecute torture since 
investigation/prosecution is impossible without previous criminalisation. However, the 
position of the Court is far from settled since, in some other cases, the Court held that the 
ban on torture embodies an ‘inherent’ duty to criminalise the relevant acts, with no 
indication that this is just a prerequisite to comply with the duty to prosecute torture.36
A caveat is needed in this regard: it is not always possible to interpret the reference to 
the ‘law’ in this kind of obligations as a reference to ‘criminal law’, and it is not always 
possible to include in the duty to ‘secure’ one right an obligation of domestic 
criminalisation. Rather, the relevant international courts and monitoring bodies, in primis 
the ECtHR, have sometimes referred to an obligation to adopt legal regulations not 
involving criminal responsibility37 or to non-legislative measures. Apparently, the subject 
matter of the rights at stake guides case-by-case the Court’s approach, which is based on 
axiological reasons, rather than on the interpretation of the relevant provisions following 
consolidated interpretive rules.38 The ECtHR appears to be guided by the nature of the 
interest protected by a specific right and by the seriousness of the offence.39
36 E.g., in relation to duties under Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, judgment, 4 
December 2003, para. 153 (however, the Court reaches this conclusion after having mentioned the obligation 
to investigate, para. 151). 
37 See the decisions studied by Dimitris Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Routledge, Abingdon, 2012), pp. 107-110; Laurens Lavrysen, Human Rights 
in a Positive State (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2016), pp. 123-130.
38 X and Y v. The Netherlands, no. 8978/80, judgment, 26 March 1985, paras. 24-27; Siliadin v. France (n 52), 
para. 122 (referring to the gravity of the acts prohibited by Article 4 and their inderogable character).
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Coming to the nature of these obligations, generic duties of prevention and to 
ensure/secure/protect rights are usually considered obligations of diligent conduct,40 which 
require states to ‘deploy adequate means, to do the utmost, to obtain [a certain] result’.41 If 
the desired result is the prevention of torture or the protection of individuals from torture, a 
state is under the duty to strive diligently to obtain that result, but if an act of torture occurs, 
the state is not responsible if it demonstrates that it has acted with the requested due 
diligence to prevent that act or protect that person.42 This possibility usually leads states to 
include generic obligations of protection/prevention along with explicit obligations of 
domestic criminalization,43 which, albeit playing a preventive function,44 should be 
39 Manacorda, supra note 1, p. 327; Seibert-Fohr, supra note 20, p. 113.
40 See Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, Due diligence e responsabilità internazionale degli Stati (Giuffrè, Milan, 
1989); José Fernando Lozano Contreras, La noción de debida diligencia en derecho internacional público 
(Atelier, Madrid, 2007); Joanna Kulesza, Due Diligence in International Law (Brill, Leiden, 2016); Sarah 
Cassella (ed.), Le standard de due diligence et la responsabilité internationale (Pedone, Paris, 2018); 
Samantha Besson, ‘La due diligence en droit international’, (2020) 409 Recueil des Cours 154-398; Heike 
Krieger, Anne Peters, Leonhard Kreuzer (eds.), Due Diligence in the International Legal Order (OUP, Oxford, 
2020).
41 ITLOS, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to 
Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, I.T.L.O.S. Reports 2011, para. 110. 
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classified differently as obligations of result under international law.45 Accordingly, prima 
facie, these are not obligations that demand the criminalisation of certain conduct, but such 
a criminalisation can be a diligent way to implement the generic duty of prevention or 
protection.
Although, originally, these international law obligations did not demand explicitly 
domestic criminalisation, over time, the consolidated jurisprudence of international courts 
and monitoring bodies tasked with the interpretation of the relevant conventions has turned 
some of these obligations into obligations of domestic criminalisation. In other words, the 
ECtHR’s and the HRC’s authoritativeness in the interpretation of the ECHR and the ICCPR 
is so well-established that it cannot be challenged. This is particularly the case of the 
ECtHR, which is the ultimate authority, with binding powers, in relation to the interpretation 
of the ECHR. Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that some implicit obligations of 
42 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 430; 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 
December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 168, Declaration of Judge Tomka, para. 4.
43 E.g., Articles 2(1) and 4 of the CAT; Articles 1 and 49-50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Chapters II and III of 
the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption; subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373 
(2001)), para. 1. 
44 Bosnia v. Serbia, supra note 42, para. 426; Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 24, para. 75; Çamdereli v. Turkey, 
no. 28433/02, judgment, 1 December 2008, para. 38. See Pasquale De Sena, ‘Responsabilité internationale et 
prévention des violations des droits de l’homme’, in Emmanuel Decaux and Sébastien Touzé (eds.), La 
prevention des violations des droits de l’homme (Pedone, Paris, 2015), pp. 41-43.
45 See supra, section 2.2. On the relevance of this difference, see infra, section 4.
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domestic criminalisation are created by the interpretive action of relevant monitoring 
mechanisms and international courts, which have turned due diligence obligations of 
prevention and protection in specific obligations of result regarding the domestic 
criminalisation of certain conduct.
3 The Italian Legislature versus International Law Obligations of Domestic 
Criminalisation 
3.1 A Legal Duty Upon the Italian Legislature
After having explored the nature and content of the obligations of domestic 
criminalisation, it is necessary to assess the role played by Italian legislature in relation to 
the implementation of these obligations. As noted, the fact that Italy is bound by an 
obligation of domestic criminalisation does not transplant into the Italian legal system the 
relevant offence: a legislative act is needed to incorporate the relevant treaty in the Italian 
legal order, and a legislative act may be needed to provide the details that are necessary in 
order to apply the treaty rules as criminal law. Usually treaties are implemented through ad 
hoc legislation, which transforms the international obligations into Italian law through 
renvoir or by adopting corresponding domestic rules.46 In the case of criminal law, domestic 
legislation is required under the human rights law principle of legality, which is protected 
both at international level47 and by Article 25(2) of the ItConst, and which bars the direct 
46 The proposal to adapt automatically the Italian legal systems to treaty obligations was rejected during the 
drafting of the ItConst. See the relevant documents in 40 Rivista di diritto internazionale (1977) 334-353.
47 See generally Claus Kreß, ‘Nulla poena nullum crimen sine lege’, MPEPIL online (2010).
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applicability of criminal law of international or EU origin.48 Indeed, even the most detailed 
international list of crimes needs some intervention from the domestic legislature, at least 
to determine the penalties that can be imposed.49 Moreover, in most cases, international 
obligations of domestic criminalisation are not sufficiently specific to respect the principle 
of legality under the ItConst. This is particularly the case of those obligations created or, at 
least, brought to the light by the interpretive action of international courts and monitoring 
bodies. In these cases, the need of an intervention of the domestic legislature is essential.
The first step is to acknowledge that, in principle, the Italian Parliament is usually free 
to adopt the legislation that it considers necessary, as long as the said legislation does not 
conflict with the ItConst.50 However, the Constitution itself may require the Parliament to 
adopt criminal legislation in a certain field. This is the case of Article 13(4), according to 
which, ‘any act of physical and moral violence against a person subjected to restriction of 
48 Giuseppe Tesauro, ‘Costituzione e norme esterne’, 14 Diritto dell’Unione Europea (2009) 195-229, 228; 
Viganò, supra note 28, pp. 2648, 2650; Andrea Pugiotto, ‘Repressione penale della tortura e Costituzione: 
anatomia di un reato che non c’è’, Diritto Penale Contemporaneo (7 February 2014), 5-6, 
https://archiviodpc.dirittopenaleuomo.org/d/2841-repressione-penale-della-tortura-e-costituzione-anatomia-
di-un-reato-che-non-c-e, accessed 8 March 2021. Contra, Francesco Salerno, ‘Il limite – non il contro-limite 
– della riserva di legge all’attuazione diretta della norma internazionale «generalmente riconosciuta» in 
materia penale’, in Umberto Leanza et al. (eds.), Studi in onore di Giuseppe Tesauro (Editoriale Scientifica, 
Napoli, 2014), pp. 2868-2863 (arguing that international customary obligations of domestic criminalisation 
are directly applicable).
49 Pugiotto, supra note 48, pp. 5-6; Salerno, supra note 48, p. 2887.
50 Articles 134 and 136 of the ItConst; Law no. 87, 11 March 1953.
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personal liberty shall be punished.’ Accordingly, the idea that the Italian legislature is bound 
to criminalise certain conduct is not specific of international obligations.51
There is no doubt that the Italian legislature is bound under Italian constitutional law 
to adopt such a legislation. Several constitutional provisions play a crucial role, depending 
on the source that embodies the relevant obligation. Article 10(1) of the ItConst demands 
Italy to comply with international customary obligations of domestic criminalisation. 
Article 11 binds Italy to give effect to secondary legislation enacted by the UN and the EU, 
including obligations of domestic criminalisation.52 Moreover, Article 117(1) affirms that 
legislative powers shall be exercised ‘in compliance with . . . the constraints deriving from 
EU legislation and international obligations.’ A consolidated trend in the case law of the 
Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) affirms that this provision is the source of the binding 
power of treaty law in the Italian legal system, with the exception of obligations under UN 
and EU law.53 Accordingly, the duty to implement treaty obligations of domestic 
criminalisation outside the cases of EU and UN law is based on Article 117(1). In sum, the 
Italian participation in international organisations and multilateral treaties has widened the 
51 See Domenico Pulitanò, ‘Obblighi costituzionali di tutela penale?’, 26 Rivista Italiana di Diritto e 
Procedura Penale (1983) 484-531; Caterina Paonessa, Gli obblighi di tutela penale (ETS, Pisa 2009).
52 See generally Natalino Ronzitti (ed.), L’articolo 11 della Costituzione: Baluardo della vocazione 
internazionalistica dell’Italia (Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2013). 
53 See in particular no. 348/2007, judgment, 22 October 2007, and no. 349/2007, judgment, 22 October 2007.
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number of constitutionally relevant obligations of domestic criminalisation that bind the 
Italian legislature.54
This conclusion is applicable to explicit obligations of domestic criminalisation, as 
well as to implicit obligations of domestic criminalisation. Indeed, the ItCC has affirmed 
that the obligations descending from the ECHR should be applied following the 
consolidated case law of the ECtHR, which the states parties tasked with delivering the ‘last 
word’ on the interpretation and application of the Convention.55 According to the ItCC, Italy 
is bound by the rules embodied in the ECHR, rather than by the mere wording of the relevant 
provisions, in the sense that Italy must implement the text of the ECHR as interpreted and 
applied by the ECtHR in its case law.56 The reference to the ‘consolidated’ case law of the 
ECtHR57 includes the ECtHR’s views on implicit obligations of domestic criminalisation 
under Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the ECHR, which have been acknowledged in more than sixty-
five judgments.58 
54 Viganò, supra note 28, pp. 2650-2651; Angela Colella, ‘La repressione penale della tortura: riflessioni de 
iure condendo’, Diritto Penale Contemporaneo (22 July 2014),  
https://archiviodpc.dirittopenaleuomo.org/autori/34-angela-colella, accessed 8 March 2021.
55 Decision no. 349/2007, supra note 53.
56 Decision no. 348/2007, supra note 53. 
57 On this notion, see Pierfrancesco Rossi, ‘La rilevanza per il giudice nazionale della giurisprudenza 
“consolidata” della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo’, in Giuseppe Palmisano (ed.), Il diritto internazionale 
ed europeo nei giudizi interni (Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2020), pp. 233-261, and the sources discussed 
therein.
58 Malby, supra note 20, p. 69.
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The Government and the Parliament are involved in the implementation of the 
relevant ECtHR’s judgments. Indeed, Article 5(3)(a-bis) of the Law no. 400 of 1988 tasks 
the President of the Council of Ministers with implementing ECtHR’s decisions as far as 
expected by the Government, with informing the Parliament on any ECtHR’s decision 
against Italy, and with presenting an annual report to the Parliament on the Italian 
implementation of said judgments. 
The only limit that the Italian legislature can impose on the duty of domestic 
criminalisation is in respect to the ItConst itself. In particular, international obligations 
covered by Articles 10(1) and 11 cannot be implemented if they conflict with the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution,59 whereas international obligations binding 
pursuant to Article 117(1) are subject to the respect of the entire Constitution.60 
Accordingly, considering that an international obligation of domestic criminalisation binds 
the Italian legislature under Articles 10(1) and 11 or under Article 117(1),61 different 
grounds of non-compliance under Italian constitutional law may exist.
59 E.g., ItCC, no. 183, judgment, 27 December 1973; no. 48, judgment, 18 June 1979; no. 238, judgment, 22 
October 2014.
60 E.g., ItCC, decision no. 348/2007, supra note 53, and decision no. 349/2007, supra note 53.
61 See generally Francesco Salerno, ‘La coerenza dell'ordinamento interno ai trattati internazionali in ragione 
della Costituzione e della loro diversa natura’, 16 Osservatorio delle fonti (2018) 1-33. In relation to the ICC 
Statute, some authors invoke Article 11 (e.g., Flavia Lattanzi, ‘Un piccolo passo sulla via dell'adeguamento 
allo Statuto della Corte penale internazionale’, 96 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2013) 492, 509; Alessandra 
Annoni, ‘La compatibilità dello statuto della corte penale internazionale con la Constituzione italiana’, in 
Giovanni Priori Posada (ed.), Constitución, Derecho y Derechos (Palestra, Lima, 2016) p. 282), others Article 
117(1) (Marco Roscini, ‘Great Expectations: The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy’, 5 Journal 
International Criminal Justice (2007) 493, 495).
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3.2 The Measures That the Italian Legislature Must Adopt
International and EU obligations of domestic criminalisation do not require the Italian 
legislature to adopt a specific criminal law act. Accordingly, from the standpoint of 
international and EU law it is irrelevant whether a specific obligation is implemented by a 
law enacted by the Parliament, or by a regional law, or by a legislative act of the 
Government. The only relevant issue is the content of the criminal law act. To this end, the 
distinction between different kinds of obligations of domestic criminalisation is relevant to 
determine which is the content of the criminal law instrument that the Italian legislature 
must enact.
First, it should be emphasised that international and EU obligations of domestic 
criminalisation lay the bare minimum description of the conduct that a State must 
criminalise. This means that states are free to adopt a more restrictive criminal legislation 
with the aim to protect the same values at the basis of the international or EU obligation. 
E.g., although the UN Genocide Convention requires the criminalisation of certain acts 
against national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, nothing prevents Italy or other states 
from adopting broader rules to protect other groups (e.g., political ones) under the label of 
genocide.62
Second, the nomen juris under which a certain conduct is criminalised is largely 
irrelevant. This is uncontested in relation to implicit obligations of domestic criminalisation, 
which are fulfilled if a state adequately criminalises in its legal system actions that violate 
62 Ben Saul, ‘The Implementation of the Genocide Convention at the National Level’, in Paola Gaeta (ed.), 
The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford, 2009), pp. 58-84.
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or endanger a certain protected human right.63 For this reason, Italy does not have to adopt 
ad hoc legislation to implement ECHR’s obligations, but rather, it may be possible that its 
domestic legal system is already sufficiently adequate, or that minor changes are needed. In 
other words, the scrutiny of the ECtHR and other monitoring mechanisms is not on the form 
of the implementation of the obligations of domestic criminalisation, but rather, on the 
substance of its effectiveness to deter and punish violations of the protected rights.
The conclusion can be reached in relation to international and EU explicit obligations 
of domestic criminalisation as well. Again, the example of torture elucidates the issue in a 
clear way. The UN Committee Against Torture (ComAT) criticised Italy on many occasions 
for failure of criminalising torture under the CAT.64 The Italian defence that ordinary crimes 
in the Italian Criminal Code were enough to fulfil the obligation of domestic criminalisation 
was dismissed as irrelevant.65 Accordingly, one could wonder whether ad hoc legislation 
was due. Yet, at a close scrutiny, it is apparent that the Committee was not criticising the 
nomen juris of the relevant crimes, but rather, their actual correspondence with the 
63 Paolo Lobba, ‘Punire la tortura in Italia. Spunti ricostruttivi a cavallo tra diritti umani e diritto penale’, 10 
Diritto Penale Contemporaneo (2017) 181-250, 205, 208.
64 E.g., ComAT, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under Article 19 of the Convention 
(CAT/C/9/Add.9); ComAT, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under Article 19 of the 
Convention (CAT/C/25/Add.4), para. 5.
65 E.g., ComAT, Report to the General Assembly (A/47/44), para. 314; ComAT, Consideration of reports 
submitted by States parties under Article 19 of the Convention (CAT/C/44/Add.2), paras. 7-10; ComAT, 
Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under Article 19 of the Convention (CAT/C/67/Add.3), 
paras. 12-18.
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obligations embodied in the CAT.66 Consequently, a specific criminal legislation is the 
better solution not because it is the only way to implement the Convention, but because it is 
the most efficient way to ensure that domestic criminal legislation covers all the relevant 
aspects of the ban on torture and related procedural issues.67
Finally, it is possible that Italy is bound to adopt some criminal provisions to 
implement international instruments which, as such, do not embody obligations of domestic 
criminalisation. The best example is that of the ICC Statute. Under this treaty, states do not 
have a legal duty to enact domestic criminal legislation in relation to the crimes punished 
therein,68 with the exception of a (rather marginal) obligation to criminalise offences against 
the administration of justice under Article 70(4)(a). If states do not criminalise domestically 
international crimes, the only consequence is that the resulting lack of domestic prosecution 
may trigger the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under the principle of complementarity.69 
66  See the discussion in Antonio Marchesi, ‘Delitto di tortura e obblighi internazionali di punizione’, 101 
Rivista di diritto internazionale (2018) 131-150, 133-134.
67 Lutz Oette, ‘Implementing the prohibition of torture: the contribution and limits of national legislation and 
jurisprudence’, 16 International Journal of Human Rights (2012) 717-736, 720; Nóra Katona, ‘Art. 4: 
Obligation to Criminalize Torture’, in Manfred Nowak et al. (eds.), The United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and its Optional Protocol: A Commentary (2nd ed., OUP, Oxford, 2019), pp. 182-184. 
68 See Enrico Amati et al., Introduzione al diritto penale internazionale (4th ed., Giappichelli, Torino, 2020), 
pp. 46; William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (6th ed., CUP, Cambridge, 
2020), pp. 190-192; Werle and Jessberger, supra note 10, p. 181. Contra, Roscini, supra note 61, pp. 495-
497; Annoni, supra note 61, p. 277.
69 Olympia Bekou, ‘In the Hands of the State: Implementing Legislation and Complementarity’, in Carten 
Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity (CUP, 
Cambridge, 2011), pp. 838-841.
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However, the lack of incorporation of the crimes in the Italian legal system may make it 
difficult for Italy to comply with some of its obligations of cooperation under Part 9 of the 
Statute, which may require, for instance in the case of surrender of suspects, that the charges 
are criminalised at domestic level.70 Accordingly, it is possible to argue that Italy, in order 
to fully implement some obligations under the ICC Statute, should incorporate in its legal 
system criminal law provisions corresponding to those embodied in the Statute, even if they 
are not the object of obligations of domestic criminalisation.71
4 Consequences of Failure to Implement Obligations of Domestic Criminalisation
Any violation of an international obligation, whether through omission or 
commission, if attributable to a state, entails the responsibility of that state.72 This principle 
covers also omissions of the legislative organs.73 Accordingly, state responsibility ensues 
any failure to implement positive obligations74 such as obligations of domestic 
criminalisation: if a state does not enact the relevant legislation, that state violates 
70 Luigi Prosperi, ‘L’applicazione giudiziale delle norme dello Statuto di Roma sulla cooperazione con la 
Corte penale internazionale’, in Palmisano, supra note 57, pp. 209-214.
71 See Luigi Prosperi in this Special Issue.
72 Articles 1 and 2 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) 
(ARSIWA).
73 Ibid., Article 4(1). See Edoardo Vitta, La responsabilità internazionale dello Stato per atti legislativi 
(Giuffrè, Milano, 1953).
74 Economides, supra note 25, p. 374.
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international law.75 In such a case there is no doubt that the omission is attributable to the 
state since legislative measures are a monopoly of states organs.76
In particular, a distinction must be made. If a state does not implement an explicit 
obligation of domestic criminalisation, that state would be immediately responsible for the 
breach of that obligation. According to the ICJ, the duty to criminalise torture under the 
CAT ‘has to be implemented by the State concerned as soon as it is bound by the 
Convention’.77 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, similarly, 
held that ‘states must immediately set in motion all those procedures and measures that may 
make it possible, within their municipal legal system’ to punish torture.78 Most scholars 
support this view.79
More complex is the case in which a state violates an implicit obligation of domestic 
criminalisation. If we consider these obligations as specifications of a more generic duty of 
prevention, it could be possible to argue that the breach occurs only when the prevention or 
75 Vitta, supra note 73, p. 90; Ian Brownlie, State Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983), pp. 142-
143; Pisillo Mazzeschi, supra note 31, p. 313; James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP, 
Cambridge, 2013), pp. 120-121; Guido Acquaviva, La repressione dei crimini di guerra nel diritto 
internazionale e nel diritto italiano (Giuffrè, Milano, 2014), p. 76.
76 Benedetto Conforti, ‘Exploring the Strasbourg Case-Law: Reflections on State Responsibility for the Breach 
of Positive Obligations’, in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Dan Sarooshi (eds.), Issues of State Responsibility Before 
International Judicial Institutions (Hart, Oxford, 2004), p. 134.
77 Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 24, para. 75 (emphasis added).
78 Furundžija case, supra note 2, para. 149 (emphasis added).
79 E.g., Vitta, supra note 73, p. 90; Pisillo Mazzeschi, supra note 31, p. 313; Francesco Salerno, Diritto 
internazionale (4th ed., Cedam, Padova, 2017), pp. 472-473; van der Have, supra note 24, pp. 17, 40.
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protection fails because of the lack of a criminal law provision.80 This position, which 
reflects the views of the ILC and the ICJ on the moment in which the breach of similar 
obligations of diligent conduct occurs,81 is challenged by a growing body of academic 
literature that stresses that even obligations of due diligence are immediately due.82 In any 
case, as mentioned above, the international courts and monitoring mechanisms that have 
addressed this issue in relation to human rights obligations have turned these obligations 
into implicit obligations of result. Accordingly, they consider that a violation occurs when 
the state fails to adopt the relevant legislation.83 Therefore, states may invoke only the time 
that is strictly needed to adopt the said legislation,84 which, in the framework of EU 
obligations, is usually provided by the specific Directive,85 whereas in international law, it 
is not determined clearly.
In general international law, depending on whether the relevant obligations are 
reciprocal in nature or, as it happens for some human rights law obligations, are obligations 
80 See Furundžija case, supra note 2, para. 149.
81 Article 14(3) ARSIWA; Bosnia v. Serbia, supra note 42, para. 431.
82 Pasquale De Sena, ‘Questioni in tema di responsabilità internazionale per attività spaziali’, 73 Rivista di 
Diritto Internazionale (1990) 294-319, 301; Pisillo Mazzeschi, supra note 31, p. 313; Robert Kolb, Advanced 
Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014), p. 168; Marco 
Longobardo, ‘L’obbligo di prevenzione del genocidio e la distinzione fra obblighi di condotta e obblighi di 
risultato’, 13 Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale (2019) 237-256, 254-255; Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, 
Diritto internazionale dei diritti umani (Giappichelli, Torino, 2020), p. 111.
83 ECtHR, Cestaro v. Italy, supra note 34, paras. 209 and 225. See also Vitta, supra note 73, pp. 90-91. 
84 Pisillo Mazzeschi, supra note 31, p. 313.
85 Damian Chalmers et al., European Union Law: Text and Materials (3rd ed., CUP, Cambridge, 2018), p. 112.
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erga omnes partes, the injured state or all states parties to the relevant treaty86 may invoke 
the violation of the obligation of domestic criminalisation, even though relevant practice is 
scarce. In the EU legal system, obligations of domestic criminalisation embodied in 
directives after the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty can be the object of an infringement 
procedure started by the European Commission or by another member state.87
5 Conclusions
Obligations of domestic criminalisation, both under international and EU law, should 
be taken seriously by states, including Italy, because they enhance the goals of the 
international community in the field of human rights and fight against international and 
transnational crime. As demonstrated by this study, their violation is a source of 
international responsibility. Accordingly, states must understand which is the content of the 
relevant obligations in order to implement them in the proper way. The Italian legislature is 
bound to adopt the relevant domestic legislation both as an organ of Italy and under the 
ItConst, which requires Italy to comply with international and EU law obligations. As a 
result, the inactivity of the Italian legislature where obligations of domestic criminalisation 
are pending should be framed as an international wrongful act, and acted upon accordingly, 
rather than as a mere political choice in the context of the discretion of Italian legislative 
bodies. 
86 See Articles 42 and 48(1) ARSIWA; Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 24, paras. 68-70; Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Order of 
23 January 2020, para. 41.
87 Articles 258-259 TFUE. See also Angela Colella, Gli obblighi sovranazionali di tutela penale (PhD 
Dissertation, University of Milan 2012), pp. 337-339. 
